Currently Viewing:
The American Journal of Managed Care December 2018
The American Journal of Managed Care December 2018
MANAGERIAL
James Baumgardner, PhD; Ahva Shahabi, PhD; Christopher Zacker, RPh, PhD; and Darius Lakdawalla, PhD
POLICY
Rozalina G. McCoy, MD, MS; Kari S. Bunkers, MD; Priya Ramar, MPH; Sarah K. Meier, PhD; Lorelle L. Benetti, BA; Robert E. Nesse, MD; and James M. Naessens, ScD, MPH
TRENDS FROM THE FIELD
Natasha Parekh, MD, MS; Inmaculada Hernandez, PharmD, PhD; Thomas R. Radomski, MD, MS; and William H. Shrank, MD, MSHS
WEB EXCLUSIVE
James O. Breen, MD
Shail M. Govani, MD, MSc; Rachel Lipson, MSc; Mohamed Noureldin, MBBS, MSc; Wyndy Wiitala, PhD; Peter D.R. Higgins, MD, PhD, MSc; Sameer D. Saini, MD, MSc; Jacqueline A. Pugh, MD; Dawn I. Velligan, PhD; Ryan W. Stidham, MD, MSc; and Akbar K. Waljee, MD, MSc
John A. Romley, PhD; Andrew Delgado, PharmD; Jinjoo Shim, MS; and Katharine Batt, MD
Currently Reading
Medicare Advantage Control of Postacute Costs: Perspectives From Stakeholders
Emily A. Gadbois, PhD; Denise A. Tyler, PhD; Renee R. Shield, PhD; John P. McHugh, PhD; Ulrika Winblad, PhD; Amal Trivedi, MD; and Vincent Mor, PhD
David H. Howard, PhD; Brad Herring, PhD; John Graves, PhD; and Erin Trish, PhD
Medicare Advantage Control of Postacute Costs: Perspectives From Stakeholders
Emily A. Gadbois, PhD; Denise A. Tyler, PhD; Renee R. Shield, PhD; John P. McHugh, PhD; Ulrika Winblad, PhD; Amal Trivedi, MD; and Vincent Mor, PhD
This qualitative study examines the methods that Medicare Advantage plans use to control or reduce postacute spending and their associated unintended consequences.
ABSTRACT
Objectives: Medicare Advantage (MA) plans have strong incentives to control costs, including postacute spending; however, to our knowledge, no research has examined the methods that MA plans use to control or reduce postacute costs. This study aimed to understand such MA plan efforts and the possible unintended consequences.
Study Design: A multiple case study method was used.
Methods: We conducted 154 interviews with administrative and clinical staff working in 10 MA plans, 16 hospitals, and 25 skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) in 8 geographically diverse markets across the United States.
Results: Participants discussed how MA plans attempted to reduce postacute care spending by controlling the SNF to which patients are discharged and SNF length of stay (LOS). Plans typically influenced SNF selection by providing patients with a list of facilities in which their care would be covered. To influence LOS, MA plans most commonly authorized patient stays in SNFs for a certain number of days and required that SNFs adhere to this limitation, but they did not provide guidance or assistance in ensuring that the LOS goals were met. Hospital and SNF responses to the largely authorization-based system were frequently negative, and participants expressed concerns about potential unintended consequences.
Conclusions: In their interactions with hospitals and SNFs, MA plans attempted to influence the choice of SNF and LOS to control postacute spending. However, exerting too much influence over hospitals and SNFs, as these results seem to indicate, may have the negative consequences of delayed hospital discharge and SNFs’ avoidance of burdensome plans.
Am J Manag Care. 2018;24(12):In Press
Objectives: Medicare Advantage (MA) plans have strong incentives to control costs, including postacute spending; however, to our knowledge, no research has examined the methods that MA plans use to control or reduce postacute costs. This study aimed to understand such MA plan efforts and the possible unintended consequences.
Study Design: A multiple case study method was used.
Methods: We conducted 154 interviews with administrative and clinical staff working in 10 MA plans, 16 hospitals, and 25 skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) in 8 geographically diverse markets across the United States.
Results: Participants discussed how MA plans attempted to reduce postacute care spending by controlling the SNF to which patients are discharged and SNF length of stay (LOS). Plans typically influenced SNF selection by providing patients with a list of facilities in which their care would be covered. To influence LOS, MA plans most commonly authorized patient stays in SNFs for a certain number of days and required that SNFs adhere to this limitation, but they did not provide guidance or assistance in ensuring that the LOS goals were met. Hospital and SNF responses to the largely authorization-based system were frequently negative, and participants expressed concerns about potential unintended consequences.
Conclusions: In their interactions with hospitals and SNFs, MA plans attempted to influence the choice of SNF and LOS to control postacute spending. However, exerting too much influence over hospitals and SNFs, as these results seem to indicate, may have the negative consequences of delayed hospital discharge and SNFs’ avoidance of burdensome plans.
Am J Manag Care. 2018;24(12):In Press
